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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Throughout these proceedings, both before this Court 
and before the Industrial Commission below, the Default Indemnity 
Fund ("Fund'1) has made a number of substantial misrepresentations 
of fact. These misrepresentations are of such a nature that it 
raises the question of whether they were made with the intent to 
mislead. 
To this Court, both in its Motion for Summary 
Disposition and in its Brief, the Fund made the following 
representation of fact: 
"The Findings of Fact entered by the law judge 
after a hearing before the Industrial 
Commission on David's [the injured employee] 
application for workers1 compensation benefits 
enumerated the benefits to which David was 
entitled and went on to say: fThese . . . are 
the responsibility of the employer, since the 
employer was uninsured for workers' 
compensation purposes at the time of the 
industrial injury.'" 
Respondents1 Brief, p. 2. 
This statement of "fact" implies that in the original 
Findings of Fact the judge enumerated all of the benefits to 
which the employee was entitled and found that they are the 
responsibility of the employer. This representation is made 
throughout the Fund's Brief, see e.g., Respondents' Brief, p. 32. 
A review of the Order, Rc72, reveals that the Fund drastically 
misstated the Finding. Instead of referring to all benefits to 
which the employee was entitled, the judge was referring only to 
certain enumerated expenses. It was to some $6,800.00 in medical 
expenses that the judge was referring when he said, "These 
expenses are the responsibility of the employer. . .w Nowhere in 
the Findings does the judge enumerate the benefits to which the 
employee was entitled and goes on to state that they are the 
responsibility of the employer. Nowhere does the judge state 
that the Petitioner ("Paulsen") is liable for compensation 
benefits. The implication created by the Fund's statement of 
"fact," i.e., that the law judge set forth the liability of 
Paulsen for all benefits, is misleading. 
Next, the Fund in its Motion for Summary Disposition 
and also in its Brief represented to this Court that it "filed a 
motion on September 24, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-1-78 
(U.C.A.f 1953, as amended). The motion requested the entry of a 
Supplemental or Amended Order (R.76)." Respondents' Brief, p. 3. 
Furthermore, the Fund refers to its "motion" as a "motion to 
amend," and states that the Industrial Commission "amended its 
Order." Respondents' Brief, pp. 18, 30 (emphasis added). 
The simple fact is that the Fund made no motion at all. 
Rather, the Fund sent an ex parte letter to the administrative 
law judge requesting the issuance of a supplemental order, not an 
amended order (R.76). There is a vast difference between the two 
types of orders. This difference the Fund recognizes; yet 
because it now claims that the Order dated October 8, 1985 merely 
corrected a clerical error, which procedurally would require an 
amended order, it now seeks to characterize its ex parte letter 
as a motion to amend. 
Furthermore, during the proceedings before the 
Industrial Commission, by means of its ex parte letter, the Fund 
made further misrepresentations. It represented that the 
original Order "required that Thomas A. Paulsen Co. pay David B. 
Paulsen certain sums of money representing workers' compensation 
benefits as a result of his industrial accident" and that the 
Order required that the "Default Indemnity Fund pay those 
benefits with full rights of subrogation" (R.76). A review of 
the original Order demonstrates that both representations were 
false (R.71-75). 
ARGUMENT 
In its Brief, the Fund raises a number of arguments. 
Only four of these arguments address the issues at bar. These 
are whether the employer can escape ultimate liability for 
injuries to the employee; whether the Industrial Commission can 
order an employer to pay monies directly to the Default Indemnity 
Fund; whether there was a clerical error in the January 23, 1985 
Order; and whether that Order was an Interlocutory Order. 
Arguments one and two will be discussed in Point I below. The 
other arguments will be discussed separately in Points II and 
III. 
POINT I 
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND'S RIGHT 
OF SUBROGATION DOES NOT EMPOWER THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO ORDER AN 
EMPLOYER TO PAY MONIES DIRECTLY TO 
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND. 
In Point I of its Brief, the Fund presents three 
arguments in support of the Supplemental Order. First, the Fund 
argues that an employer cannot escape ultimate liability for 
workers' compensation benefits due the employee; second, that the 
existence of the Fund does not alter or excuse this ultimate 
liability; and third, that the Fundfs subrogation rights entitles 
it to reimbursement. These contentions are raised for the first 
time on appeal. "It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not 
raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered for the 
first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 
(Utah 1983). 
Should the Fund be allowed to make its argument, 
Paulsen responds that the Fund's contentions are irrelevant to 
the issues at bar. Paulsen contends that the law judge made a 
determination that Paulsen had no liability to pay benefits to 
the injured employee primarily because Paulsen was unable to pay, 
because he had made a good faith effort to obtain insurance, and 
because there were other sources of funds available. This view 
of the judge's thinking is supported by the original Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. First, the sentence which 
reads, "These expenses are the responsibility of the employer, 
since the employer was uninsured for workers1 compensation 
purposes at the time of the industrial injury" indicates that the 
judge thought that the employer was liable only if there were no 
other sources available for payment. There would be no reason to 
set forth the second clause of the sentence if the judge viewed 
the employer's liability as the Fund does. Second, the judge 
made a finding of fact that Paulsen made a good-faith effort to 
be insured. Why make this finding unless the judge felt it was 
of some significance? Third, the judge did not impose the 
fifteen percent (15%) penalty provided for under Section 
35-1-107(8), U.C.A. And fourth, Section 35-1-82.52, U.C.A., 
requires the law judge to set forth the party responsible for 
paying compensation benefits• The judge named only the Fund as 
the responsible party• By so doing, the judge indicated that 
Paulsen was not responsible. These Findings, as they stand, are 
sufficient to support a judicial determination that Paulsen was 
not liable to the employee, as there were other sources of funds 
available. 
If Paulsen's contention is correct, i.e., that the 
judge determined that Paulsen was not liable, then whether an 
employer has ultimate liability or not is now irrelevant. If the 
Order was legally insufficient, the Fund could have appealed 
within the required time. It did not, and may not raise that 
argument now. 
The Fund further contends that possible criminal 
liability demonstrates that the Fund was not set up to indemnify 
the employer. Again, this is raised for the first time. For the 
reasons set forth above, whether Paulsen was guilty of 36 
separate misdemeanors, even if true, is now irrelevant. 
The Fund finally contends that its rights of 
subrogation granted in Section 35-1-107(3), U.C.A., enables the 
Industrial Commission to order Paulsen to pay monies directly to 
the Fund. Again, this argument is raised for the first time on 
appeal. The Fund reasons that since the employee could go to the 
Industrial Commission to seek redress and the Commission could 
order the employer to pay money to the employee, then because the 
Fund has the rights of the employee by subrogation, a fortiori, 
the Commission can order the employer to pay money to the Fund. 
The Fundfs tantalogical argument contains one major 
flaw. Section 35-1-107(3), U.C.A., limits the Fund's subrogation 
rights to those rights, powers, and benefits held by an employee 
against an employer who fails to make the compensation payments. 
The employee's rights in such a case as set forth in Section 
35-1-59, U.C.A., are limited solely to docketing an abstract of 
the award with a district court and executing thereon. 
Therefore, the Fund's subrogation rights only extend to docketing 
the abstract of the award in the district court. The Commission 
has no authority to order Paulsen to pay money directly to the 
Fund. The Fund's argument when taken to its logical conclusion 
suggests that where the employer is uninsured, the Fund could, by 
making a payment of benefits to an employee, step into the shoes 
of the injured employee, even before the employee seeks 
compensation. Thereby, under its view of its subrogation powers, 
the Fund could obtain the right to determine whether to pursue a 
civil or administrative remedy against the employer, and 
thereafter obtain an order directing the employer to pay money 
directly to it. The enabling act does not go so far, either to 
allow the Fund the above rights or the rights it now asserts. 
n 
Furthermore, the Fund's argument misconstrues the 
meaning of the word "subrogation." Subrogation simply allows the 
substitution of one party for another. In other words, the Fund 
can only obtain the rights held by the employee. It cannot 
obtain any rights independent of or greater than the employee's 
rights. Inasmuch as the employee had already obtained an award 
from the Commission, he could not obtain another award for the 
same injury. Yet, the Fund argues that its subrogation rights 
granted it the power to obtain a second award. If the Fund's 
contention is correct, i.e., that Paulsen is obligated to pay 
benefits under the original Order, and if the Supplemental Order 
is valid, then Paulsen is obligated to pay the awards of both 
Orders. The Fund's argument cannot avoid this result. The 
Supplemental Order did nothing to extinguish Paulsen's alleged 
obligation under the original Order. However, if Paulsen was not 
liable under the original Order, which is necessary to avoid 
double liability, then the Supplemental Order granted rights to 
the Fund which the employee was denied in the original Order, 
i.e., rights against Paulsen. Thus the Supplemental Order 
conferred rights independent of those granted the employee. 
The rub in this case is that the judge did not order 
Paulsen to make any payment to the employee. Thereforer the 
employee had no rights against the employer. Thus the Fund had 
no rights against the employer. If the Fund felt this improper, 
it should have sought review within the applicable time period to 
have Paulsen included in the order to pay the employee's 
benefits. The Commission's Supplemental Order requiring Paulsen 
to pay money directly to the Fund was improper. Simply stated, 
the Fund's right of subrogation extended only to docketing an 
abstract of an award to the employee, not the Fund, and executing 
thereon. The Fund does not need a Supplemental Order to exercise 
what rights it has. The Fund had no rights to obtain an order 
directing Paulsen to pay money directly to it. 
POINT II 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER WAS NOT 
ISSUED TO CORRECT A CLERICAL ERROR. 
The Fund next contends that its ex parte letter and the 
Supplemental Order issued pursuant thereto were in response to a 
clerical error. Again, this contention is raised for the first 
time on appeal. The Court should not permit late-raised 
justifications for prior actions. 
If the Fund is permitted to make this argumentf Paulsen 
responds as follows: Assuming arguendo that the Commission has 
authority to correct clerical errors, the Supplemental Order was 
improper for four reasons: First, at the time the Fund requested 
the Supplemental Orderf neither the Fund nor the Commission 
thought that the Supplemental Order was to correct a clerical 
error. Second, the January 22, 1985 Order did not contain a 
clerical error* Third, even if the original Order contained a 
clerical error, the Commission went too far in making the alleged 
correction* And fourth, proper procedures were not used making 
the alleged correction* 
A. At the time the Fund requested the Supplemental 
Order, neither the Fund nor the Commission thought that the 
Supplemental Order was to correct a clerical error* 
There is absolutely no evidence that at the time the 
Supplemental Order was entered, the Fund or the Commission 
thought the original Order contained a clerical error. In fact, 
the Fundfs actions and earlier statements demonstrate the 
opposite to be true* 
In its letter to the law judge, seeking the issuance of 
the Supplemental Order, the Fund made two representations of 
facts First, that the original Order required Paulsen to pay 
benefits to the injured employee? and second, that the original 
Order granted the Fund the rights of subrogation. See R.76* 
However, these two "facts" are the very "facts" it now represents 
to this Court that the original Order lacked. 
"In reviewing the Findings of Fact entered in 
conjunction with that Order, it is clear that 
the law judge had omitted language from the 
Order regarding the employer's ultimate 
liability*" 
Respondents1 Brief, p. 18. 
And also: 
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"The Order which was based upon those findings 
inadvertently failed to reflect either the 
Fund's subrogation rights as against the 
employer or the employer's ultimate 
responsibility for payment of the benefits." 
Respondents1 Brief, p. 19. 
The Fund cannot assert to the tribunal below a need for 
a Supplemental Order based on the existence of a specific set of 
facts and then justify to this Court on appeal the issuance of 
the Supplemental Order by asserting that those same facts do not 
exist. The Fund's argument is duplicitous. 
Additionally, the record is abundantly clear that the 
Fund was not seeking to correct a clerical error. In requesting 
the Supplemental Order the Fund made no mention of any supposed 
inadequacies in the original Order. The Fund only sought an 
order requiring Paulsen to pay money directly to the Fund. 
That the Fund was not seeking to correct a clerical 
error is further buttressed by the fact that it sought a 
supplemental order. Even though the procedures for correcting a 
clerical error are not set forth in the statute, it is clear that 
a supplemental order is not the proper procedure. A nunc pro 
tunc amendment of the original Order is the proper way to correct 
such errors. Apparently in recognition of this fact, the Fund 
now contends that its letter constituted "a motion to amend the 
Order . . . " Respondents' Brief, p. 18. This, however, was not 
the case. The Fund requested the Commission to "issue a 
-11-
Supplemental Order . . ." (R.76) (emphasis added). There is a 
fundamental distinction between a request to enter an amended 
Order and a request to issue a Supplemental Order. 
Moreover, the Fund now contends that its "motion" was 
made so that the Order would correctly reflect "the Findings of 
Fact, the express intent of the administrative law judge, and the 
law applicable to this case." Respondents' Brief, p. 18, 
emphasis added. For the Fund to seek to have the Order correctly 
reflect the applicable law indicates that the Fund was seeking, 
at least in part, a correction of a judicial determination and 
not a correction of a clerical error. 
Finally, the Fund contends that a clerical error 
"resulted in the omission of the specific finding of fact 
regarding the employer's ultimate liability." Respondents1 
Brief, p* 3-4, emphasis added. Thus, the Fund contends that not 
only did the judge inadvertently omit language in the Order 
requiring Paulsen to pay any benefits, but that the judge also 
omitted finding ultimate liability on Paulsen's part. For 
liability to exist, the judge must make such findings. Section 
35-1-82.52, U.C.A. That the Fund sought a supplemental order to 
supply an allegedly omitted finding, and also sought in the same 
supplemental order to have the original Order modified to reflect 
the added finding is far beyond any attempt to correct a clerical 
error. 
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It is also clear from the record that the Commission 
did not consider the Fund's request to be a "motion" to correct a 
clerical error. If the Supplemental Order was intended to 
correct a mere omission in the Order, all that would be required 
is the addition of the omitted item. There would be no reason to 
add additional Findings in an effort to support the Supplemental 
Order. Yet the Supplemental Order contains additional Findings. 
R.77. Therefore, it is clear that the Commission did not 
consider the ex parte letter as a motion to correct a clerical 
error. 
B. The January 22, 1985 Order did not contain a 
clerical error. 
It is generally held that where a party moves to have a 
clerical error corrected, that party bears the burden of proof. 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 221. Further, the power to 
enter the amendment nunc pro tunc should be exercised only upon 
clear, cogent and convincing evidence. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Judgments, Section 217. Nothing should be left to guesswork, 
speculation, or conjecture. Application of Beaver Dan Ditch Co., 
93 P.2d 934 (Wyo. 1939). Therefore, the Fund has the burden of 
proving the existence of a clerical error by clear and convincing 
evidence, without resort to guesswork, speculation, or 
conjecture. The proof set forth by the Fund does not rise to 
this standard. Accordingly, this Court should find that no 
clerical error was made. 
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As stated above, this is the first time the Fund has 
raised the contention that its letter filed on September 24, 1985 
was a motion to correct a clerical error. Therefore, the only 
evidence which supports its contention must be found in the 
original Order. The Fund contends that because the Findings 
contain the language, "These expenses are the responsibility of 
the employer . . . ," and yet the Order does not require Paulsen 
to pay benefits, there was an "inadvertent" omission and a 
clerical error. 
Assuming that an administrative agency has authority to 
correct a clerical error, and that that authority is as broad as 
the authority granted under Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., then the Fund 
is correct in defining a clerical error as a "mistake or omission 
mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which 
does not involve a legal decision . . . " Stranger v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983). However, 
the mistake that the Fund claims to have occurred is not apparent 
from the record, nor is the proof thereof free from guesswork, 
speculation, or conjecture, and in fact the so-called "mistake" 
involved a legal decision. 
The Fund assumes that the administrative law judge 
inadvertently omitted ordering Paulsen to pay the benefits. In 
support of this, the Fund states that the judge enumerated the 
benefits the worker was entitled to be paid and then stated: 
-14-
"These . • . are the responsibility of the employer. • •w 
Respondents' Brief, p. 2. The Fund apparently concludes that 
this finding should be reflected in the Order. As shown above, 
the Fund misstates the Findings. If the portion excised by the 
fund is supplied, the meaning of the sentence changes. It is 
clear that the sentence refers only to the medical expenses. 
Nowhere in the Findings does the judge state that Paulsen is 
liable for compensation benefits. Therefore, even if this Court 
were to accept the Fund's late-asserted contention of clerical 
error, it must reduce the Supplemental Order to the amount of 
$6,804.49. 
Further, as pointed out in Point I, supra, the original 
Findings indicate that the judge treated the Fund as an insurer, 
and therefore considered Paulsen to have no liability either to 
the employee or to the Fund. Nowhere does the judge state that 
Paulsen is liable to the Fund for any amounts paid by the Fund. 
It is for this reason that Paulsen is not ordered to pay 
benefits. This omission was the result of a legal decision. It 
was not, therefore, a clerical error. The Fund cannot show 
otherwise without guesswork, speculation, or conjecture. Whether 
the judge was correct in his determination is now irrelevant as 
the time for review has passed. The Fund advanced nothing in the 
tribunal below to meet its burden of proof and has failed to meet 
its burden here. The the Supplemental Order should be vacated as 
no clerical error has been shown. 
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clerical error, the Supplemental Order is invalid as it does more 
than correct a clerical error. 
If this Court accepts the Fund's contention that its 
"motion," i.e., its ex parte letter, was to correct a clerical 
error, it must nevertheless vacate the Supplemental Order. The 
Supplemental Order goes far beyond anything necessary to correct 
the contended error. The Fund claims to have sought the addition 
of language in the Order regarding the employer's ultimate 
liability. Respondents1 Brief, p. 18. The only indication in 
the original Findings of Fact which would support the Fund's 
determination that Paulsen had "ultimate liability" is the 
language that the medical expenses are the responsibility of the 
employer. The judge gave no indication that the employer was 
responsible for the compensation benefits. Therefore, the most 
that the Fund could have received under its theory was an order 
compelling Paulsen to pay $6,804.49 to the employee. 
The Supplemental Order requires Paulsen to pay 
$21,002.63 to the Fund. R.77. As discussed in Point I, not only 
is this greater than the rights provided by Section 35-1-107, 
U.C.A., which gives the Fund only those rights held by the unpaid 
employee, it far exceeds anything necessary to correct a clerical 
error. A correction of a clerical error would have simply 
required a nunc pro tunc order adding Paulsen's name to the 
-16-
original Order. Therefore, the Supplemental Order is invalid as 
it goes beyond what is necessary to correct a clerical error. As 
the Supplemental Order goes too far, it should be vacated. 
D. A Finding of clerical error cannot be sustained 
because proper procedures were not followed by the Commission. 
The Workers' Compensation Act provides no guidelines 
for the procedure of correcting a clerical error. Assuming that 
the Fund is correct in its assertion that Section 35-1-78 
provides the administrative agency with authority to make such 
corrections, the agency must follow procedures necessary to reach 
a proper determination. Paulsen admits that the procedures of 
the Commission are more relaxed than those of the Courts; 
howeverf they should not be so relaxed that substantial errors 
are thereby permitted to occur. Due process is also required of 
administrative agencies. 
The record shows that the so-called "motion" of the 
Fund was ex parte, that it was filed late, that the Fund's 
request substantially misstated the original Order (The letter 
states that Paulsen was required by the Order to pay benefits to 
the employee and that the Order provided the Fund with full 
rights of subrogation. Neither representation was correct 
[R.76].), that no evidence was taken on the "motion," and that no 
hearing was held on the "motion." In fact, very few, if any, 
procedures were followed in issuing the Supplemental Order. 
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Paulsen had no opportunity to contradict the Fund's assertions or 
to defend his own position. Paulsen was thereby denied due 
process. The Supplemental Order issued pursuant to such faulty 
procedures should be set aside as invalid. 
E. The Default Indemnity Fund should be estopped from 
asserting that the original Order contained a clerical error. 
As pointed out in Subsection "A," suprar the Fund 
represented to the administrative law judge that the original 
Order required Paulsen to pay benefits to the employee and also 
granted to Fund the rights of subrogation. It would be 
inequitable to allow the Fund to assert now that the original 
Order does not require Paulsen to pay benefits or grant to the 
Fund the rights of subrogation. The Fund should be estopped from 
making these assertions. 
POINT III 
THE JANUARY 22, 1985 ORDER WAS NOT 
INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE. 
The Fund's final contention is that the original Order 
was an interlocutory order and did not start the appeal time 
running. Again, this argument is raised for the first time on 
appeal and should not be considered by the Court. 
However, Paulsen responds that the Fund's suggestion is 
incredible. The language of the Order could not be more clear: 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for 
Review of the foregoing shall be filed in 
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writing within fifteen (15) days from the date 
hereof specifying in detail the particular 
errors and objections and unless so filed this 
Order shall be final and not subject to review 
or appeal." R.74. 
The assertion that the Order was final only as to the employeefs 
entitlement to benefits and the petitionees then existing 
inability to pay also contradicts the clear language of the 
Order. 
The Fund's assertion that because the Order was silent 
in certain areas the Order became interlocutory in nature is 
certainly unique, and is unsupported by case law. Furthermore, 
the Order is silent only under the Fund's view of the facts. The 
case cited by the Fund, Lantham Co. v. The Industrial Commission, 
29 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (March 17, 1986), is of no help. In 
Lantham, the judge specifically deferred the determination of a 
particular issue, which deferral made the order interlocutory. 
However, here the judge specifically stated that the Order was to 
be final. No deferral was made or intended. Therefore, the 
cited case is distinguishable. If the Fund felt that the Order 
lacked some essential item, it should have sought review within 
the proper time as directed by the Order. The Fund's failure to 
do so does not change a final order into an interlocutory order. 
The Fund argues that the issue of the Fund's 
subrogation rights was reserved to a later date in the event the 
petitioner's financial ability improved. Respondents' Brief, p. 
-19-
32. This "statement of fact" is either accurate or it is not. 
The Fund cannot assert facts in the alternative. If truef the 
cited "fact" undermines the Fund's clerical-error theory. If the 
judge deferred a determination of the Fund's subrogation rights, 
then the omission of the Fund's subrogation rights in the 
original Order was not inadvertent and could not constitute a 
clerical error. Either the judge deferred the issue or he did 
not, but the Fund cannot have it both ways. 
Furthermore, if the Fund is correct in contending that 
the original Order was interlocutory because the judge deferred a 
determination of the Fund's subrogation rights until Paulsen's 
financial position improved, then the Supplemental Order must 
necessarily be vacated. No evidence was offered or adduced as to 
whether Paulsen's financial position had improved. Due process 
would require some form of a hearing before the final order was 
entered. The Supplemental Order was issued without a hearing and 
therefore violated Paulsen's rights to due process. 
Accordingly, the Supplemental Order should be vacated. 
Again, if the Fund is correct in its contention/ then 
the facts as contended would support Paulsen's position. In 
order for the Fund's assertion to be accurater the judge must 
necessarily have determined that the Fund's right to 
reimbursement depended upon the employer's ability to pay. 
Otherwise^ why would the judge defer the determination of the 
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subrogation rights "to a later date in the event the petitioner's 
financial ability improved." Respondents' Brief, p. 32. 
Finally, the Fund's list of what the judge did not do 
in the original Order based on what the judge could not do is 
irrelevant. As pointed out above, the issue of whether the judge 
acted within his authority in the original Order is now closed. 
If the judge made an improper determination in the original 
Order, it was subject to review only for 15 days. After that 
time had expired the Fund cannot contest the Order by alleging 
that the judge was without authority to so act. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fund presents four arguments in response to 
Paulsen's Brief: First, that the employer cannot escape ultimate 
liability for injuries to the employee; second, that the Fund's 
rights of subrogation entitled it to an order requiring Paulsen 
to pay money directly to it; third, that the original Order 
contained a clerical error; and fourth, that the original Order 
was interlocutory in nature. Each of these arguments was raised 
for the first time on appeal and should be disregarded. However, 
even if the Fund's contentions receive full consideration, it has 
been shown that they are either irrelevant to the issues at bar, 
that they are inconsistent with positions taken previously, or 
that they are not in accordance with the established law. 
The Fund's contention that Paulsen cannot escape 
ultimate liability for payment of the benefits is irrelevant. If 
the judge made a determination on this issue, then 
reconsideration has been foreclosed as a timely review was not 
sought* The Fund's contention that the Supplemental Order, which 
required Paulsen to pay money directly to the Fund, was valid 
does not accord with established law. The Commission has no 
statutory authority to order an employer to pay money directly to 
the Fund. Furthermore, the Fund's subrogation rights are limited 
to those rights held by employee against an unpaying employer. 
Inasmuch as the employee had no rights against the employer, the 
Fund had no rights against the employer. The Fund's contention 
that the Supplemental Order amended the original Order and 
corrected a clerical error was shown inconsistent with its prior 
position taken below. It was also shown that the Fund failed to 
meet its burden in establishing the existence of a clerical 
error. Finally, the Fund's contention that the original Order 
was interlocutory in nature was shown to be unsupported by the 
law, contradictory to the language of the original Order, and 
inconsistent with the other factual positions taken by the Fund. 
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth in Petitioner's 
Brief, the Supplemental Order should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted this j£ / — day of August, lj?8j^ . 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
By ^3~ 
Attorneys for P^Ttioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the sCJ day of August, 
1986, ^ true and correct copjfeof petitioner's REPLY BRIEF was 
hand delivered to: 
Suzan Pixton, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondents 
160 East Third South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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